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We now know that the young Hans Morgenthau was involved in an intense “hidden 
dialogue” with Carl Schmitt, twentieth-century Germany’s most significant right-wing 
authoritarian political thinker.1 In his earliest Weimar-era writings, Morgenthau 
responded to Schmitt’s influential reflections on the “concept of the political”: 
Morgenthau’s assertion that Schmitt plagiarized core arguments from his 1929 
dissertation is fundamentally accurate. As Morgenthau noted, his dissertation was partly 
intended as a critical response to a 1927 essay by Schmitt in which the right-wing 
theorist had defined “the political” as constituting a fundamentally distinct and 
independent sphere of activity, existing alongside alternative modes of human activity. 
Morality concerns the problem of good and bad, aesthetics is occupied with the 
distinction between beautiful and ugly, economics is preoccupied with profitability and 
unprofitability, whereas only politics concerns the contrast between what Schmitt 
famously described as “friend and foe.”2 The young Morgenthau astutely diagnosed the 
conceptual Achilles’ heel of this initial definition of politics: Schmitt’s exposition 
misleadingly implied that political activity was limited to a pre-given set of objects or 
concerns, thereby obscuring the possibility that any conceivable sphere of activity could 
take on “political” qualities. In its stead, Morgenthau proposed that politics be described 
as “a characteristic, quality, or coloration which any substance can take on…”.3 The 
distinctive attribute of political activity was captured best by focusing on “the degree of 
intensity” of the conflict at hand. Although drawing their substantive concerns from any of 
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a host of (moral, aesthetic, and economic) arenas of human activity, identifiably political 
concerns were those in which a high “degree of intensity” of conflict had surfaced.4 
Although admitting the difficulty of determining at what specific juncture a particular 
conflict had become “intense” and thus genuinely political, Morgenthau’s 1929 
dissertation insisted that his alternative “model of intensity” offered a superior way of 
capturing the distinctive traits of political life. Schmitt seemed to agree. As Morgenthau 
noted in a 1978 autobiographical essay for the journal Society, Schmitt not only wrote 
him a complimentary letter praising his conceptual innovations, but also “changed the 
second [1932] edition of the Concept of the Political in the light of the new propositions 
of my thesis without lifting the veil of anonymity from their author.”5 In fact, Schmitt’s 
1932 study tends to drop misleading imagery of politics as a distinct or separate sphere, 
instead following Morgenthau’s conceptualization of politics as concerning conflicts 
characterized by intense enmity.6  
Morgenthau’s 1978 comments remain surprising. Why would a German-Jewish 
refuge who went on to become the leading light of postwar Realist international relations 
theory proudly proclaim that he had significantly influenced Schmitt, whom Morgenthau 
himself described, not unfairly, as having aspired to become the “Streicher of the legal 
profession” in 1930s Germany?7 Why not let the sleeping dogs lie, especially in light of 
Schmitt’s poor treatment of the young Morgenthau, as bitterly recounted in his 
reflections, as well as Schmitt’s enthusiastic embrace of Nazism? To be sure, 
Morgenthau did wait many decades before bringing this intellectual connection to an 
English-speaking audience probably unfamiliar anyhow with Schmitt and his nefarious 
quest to become the ‘crown jurist’ of National Socialism.8  
Let me suggest one explanation for Morgenthau’s concession: Morgenthau 
reminded his audience that he influenced Schmitt’s reflections on the “concept of the 
political” because it represents the tip of the iceberg in terms of the deep intellectual ties 
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between the two authors. Although I leave it to others to speculate on Morgenthau’s 
psychological motives, an element of “bad conscience” characterizes his 1978 
comments. Just as Schmitt borrowed significantly from Morgenthau’s ideas about the 
nature of politics without bothering to acknowledge his intellectual debts to the young 
Jewish doctoral student, Morgenthau was inspired by Schmitt’s substantive views about 
international relations without openly conceding how much he owed to Schmitt. In fact, 
some of Morgenthau’s most provocative observations about American foreign policy 
build directly on Schmitt’s reflections. In developing his famous critique of American 
liberalism, Morgenthau clearly builds on a number of Schmitt’s criticisms. Unfortunately, 
his arguments also reproduce Schmitt’s blind spots (I). As a number of commentators 
have noted, Morgenthau’s postwar writings are tension-ridden. While insisting on the 
necessity of establishing a world-state alone fully capable of minimizing the destructive 
potential of contemporary warfare, Morgenthau’s Realist intellectual instincts forced him 
to decry even relatively modest attempts at global governance. With growing theoretical 
and intellectual acumen, Morgenthau tackled the horrible prospect of nuclear war. Yet 
deeply rooted intellectual presuppositions prevented him from undertaking the necessary 
theoretical and political revisions to Realism. Consequently, his attempts to influence the 
study of international relations as well as U.S. policy makers always remained no less 
tension-ridden. Morgenthau’s hidden dialogue with Schmitt can help us understand the 
origins of these tensions (II).  
Thus far, international relations scholars --in contrast to some political theorists –
have shown limited interest in Morgenthau’s intellectual ties to Schmitt. What could 
arcane theoretical disputes about the “concept of the political” possibly have to do with 
the empirical realities of world politics? As I hope to show in this essay, the substantive 
overlap between the two authors is extensive. A proper understanding of that overlap is 
indispensable if we are to make sense of Morgenthau’s idiosyncratic brand of Realism.     
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1. Schmitt and Morgenthau on the Pathologies of American Power  
 
Morgenthau’s 1929 dissertation, The International Judicial System: Its Essence and Its 
Limits, offers a clear response to Schmitt’s ideas about the “concept of the political.” But 
it also refers to key arguments of one of Schmitt’s most important early books on 
international relations, the 1926 Key Questions of the League of Nations [Die Kernfrage 
des Voelkerbundes], where Schmitt offered an initial formulation of his far-reaching 
critique not only of twentieth-century liberal visions of international law, but also the 
United States and the predominant role, Schmitt argued, it played in the destruction of 
superior preliberal models of international relations.9 Morgenthau was clearly familiar 
with Schmitt’s core arguments about both international politics and the special role 
played by the United States on the global scene. Some evidence suggests that he 
followed the development of Schmitt’s ideas about international law well into the postwar 
era.10 At the very least, a number of striking parallels can be found between Schmitt’s 
criticisms of U.S. foreign policy and Morgenthau’s. 
The Westphalian State System as Historical Nostalgia 
 
Schmitt offers a deeply nostalgic vision of the early Westphalian system and 
traditional early modern European model of international law, according to which the 
moralistic and legalistic liberalism of the United States –as represented most clearly by 
the figure of Woodrow Wilson—played a decisive role in the destruction of a 
fundamentally pacific European-dominated state system. After the religious wars, 
Schmitt claims, the European continental powers successfully defused explosive political 
tensions by “de-theologizing” and neutralizing international relations.11 As clearly 
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articulated in the political and legal theory of Thomas Hobbes, legality and morality were 
strictly separated. Traditional religiously inspired notions of just war were jettisoned for a 
formalistic conception of warfare, according to which every state possesses an equal 
chance to wage war as it deems appropriate. A crucial implication of Hobbes’ critique of 
traditional natural law and his famous postulate that only the sovereign state offers an 
adequate framework for a shared definition of justice is that  
 
[i]n contrast to religious, civil, and factional wars, wars between states cannot 
be measured with the yardstick of truth and justice. War between states is 
neither just nor unjust; it is an affair of state and as such does not have to be 
just…What is therefore essential to international law, which governs relations 
between states, is law that does not distinguish between just and unjust, a 
nondiscriminatory concept of war.12
 
In this account, the only (formal) prerequisites of the right to wage war consisted of 
minimal features of sovereignty (e.g., a centralized monopoly on legitimate coercion) 
which all modern states potentially possess. Because of the resulting “neutralization” of 
international strife, warfare lost the horrible traits it had acquired during the 1500s and 
1600s, when Protestant and Catholics competed to see who could most brutally 
slaughter their religious opponents. ‘Only by means of the full elimination of the question 
of the justa causa [just cause]…did the taming of European war succeed.’13 To be sure, 
the non-European world functioned as a bloody site where European powers were 
permitted to vent their rivalries; Schmitt concedes that non-Europeans rarely benefited 
from the civilizational achievements of post-1648 European international law.14 Yet at 
least in Europe, a “neutral” conception of the right to wage war put to rest the self-
destructive dynamic of moralistic civil war and internecine religious conflict. In contrast to 
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the brutalities of the preceding religious wars, warfare on the European continent 
subsequently took the form of a highly ritualized duel, conducted according to strict 
mores and norms of behavior, between equal (sovereign state) partners. In the ritualized 
wars of early modern Europe where states could no longer plausibly make universally 
binding claims to the religious or moral superiority of their cause, both combatants and 
non-combatants were spared the worst horrors of political violence. The specter of more-
or-less permanent civil war, in which self-righteous crusaders insisted on the universal 
validity of their moral ideas before unleashing unmitigated horrors against their enemies, 
was abandoned in favour of relatively civilized wars between equal sovereign states. 
The early modern system rested on two pillars, however, both of which have 
crumbled in the twentieth century: the balance of powers, which in turn only functioned 
effectively because of a far-reaching consensus concerning basic ideals and values 
shared by all European states. When the state system embraced non-European powers 
as equals and thereby tolerated heterogeneous elements, this original cultural and 
ideological consensus collapsed. In Schmitt’s argument, any effective system of supra-
national legal coordination must rest on a substantial dose of homogeneity, which he 
saw –at least before 1933—as potentially taking many different forms.15 In the literal 
sense of the term, a fair and effective system of international law remains impossible 
because no such homogeneity can be found on the world scene. Amid the profound 
moral, political, and ethnic antagonisms of our deeply divided globe, any system of 
“international” law in reality necessarily rests on the specific political vocabulary and 
legal ideals of a particular set of power interests.   
Morgenthau offers a remarkably similar nostalgic portrayal of the trajectory of 
modern international law. For both writers, the history of modern international relations is 
essentially a Verfallsgeschichte [story of decay], in which a fundamentally sound early 
modern European-dominated system is destroyed by a far more explosive (liberal) 
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twentieth-century model no longer based on the balance of powers and a shared 
European cultural background. Although Morgenthau tends to translate Schmitt’s 
German theoretical terminology (e.g., the “political”) into language more acceptable to 
English-speaking readers (“power politics”), he not only endorses the broad outlines of 
Schmitt’s account, but also reproduces many of its specific claims as well.16 
Morgenthau’s readers will encounter similar comments about Hobbes, the positive role 
of the balance of power and European moral consensus in the traditional state system, 
relations between the European and non-European worlds, and the profound limitations 
of international law and “world public opinion” in the contemporary era.17 Even 
Morgenthau’s famous quest to show that Realism is by no means immoral or amoral in 
its fundamental orientation mirrors Schmitt’s use of Hobbes: the security of the sovereign 
state is a fundamental presupposition of moral experience, and to the extent that the 
pursuit of the “national interest” is indispensable to security, its pursuit makes an 
indispensable contribution to the realization of moral life.18  
Unfortunately, Morgenthau probably reproduces the weaknesses of Schmitt’s 
original rendition of the argument as well. Despite their shared enthusiasm for Hobbes, 
both authors have a hard time both defending Hobbes and simultaneously making sense 
of the fact that the English thinker was such a significant influence on the legal positivism 
so abhorred by both of them. Both conveniently overlook historical evidence suggesting 
that their nostalgia for a “golden age” of pre-liberal international relations is misplaced. 
Between 1648 and 1914, terrible violence not only characterized relations between 
European and non-European states, but oftentimes relations between and among 
European states as well.19 Both risk simplifying the complex nature of the nexus 
between morality and legality that emerged in European legal thought and, to some 
extent, within European legal reality in the early modern period. Legality was not 
“cleansed” of morality, as the argument sometimes misleadingly suggests. Instead a 
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new and more nuanced --but indisputably normative -- understanding of the relationship 
between morality and legality emerged which allowed for the possibility of avoiding crude 
conflations of traditional morality and legality. Indeed, that new understanding –whose 
outlines emerged most clearly during the European Enlightenment—clearly partook of 
“universalistic” moral and political ideals. As Juergen Habermas has repeatedly pointed 
out in arguing against Schmitt, universalistic normative ideals not only provide powerful 
conceptual ammunition against a crude moralization of legality, but they are probably 
indispensable if we are to defend a plausible distinction between law and morals in the 
first place.20 For Schmitt, however, modern universalism is the source of the brutalities of 
twentieth-century world affairs, rather than a foundation for precisely that delineation of 
morals from law that he considers essential to the greatest achievements of the 
European state system. To be sure, Morgenthau is more appreciative of the role 
universalistic normative ideals played in humanizing the pre-1914 European state 
system.21 Yet like Schmitt, he ultimately is reluctant to concede that such ideals can 
play, under the guise of modern liberal notions of international law, a fundamentally 
positive role. In accordance with Schmitt, Morgenthau repeatedly depicts the twentieth-
century international legal offspring of Enlightenment universalism –most prominently: 
the League of Nations and United Nations—in a negative light.  
 
 
1.a. American Liberalism and the Origins of Total War 
 
Of course, Schmitt and Morgenthau are by no means the only analysts of 
modern international relations to offer a nostalgic gloss on the pre-twentieth-century 
European state system. Nor are they the only writers who trace decisive breaks to the 
traditional order to Wilsonian liberalism. However, many features of Morgenthau’s 
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account arguably build directly on the idiosyncrasies of Schmitt’s. Both authors attribute 
many of the brutalities of twentieth-century global politics to the increased power of the 
United States. Of course, in Morgenthau’s account, in striking contrast to Schmitt’s, Nazi 
Germany plays a key role in the demolition of the traditional balance of power; 
Morgenthau dates the demolition of the traditional state system to 1933.22 However, his 
polemical discussions of the pathologies of U.S. foreign policy often mirror Schmitt’s 
tendency to emphasize the central role played by the United States in undermining an 
otherwise sound European-dominated system.  
The universalistic aspirations of American liberalism engender a remoralization of 
international relations that paves the way for the ills of total war. Although neither 
Schmitt nor Morgenthau neglects the technological sources of total war, both underline 
the importance of the revival of the traditionalistic garb of “just war,” now dressed in the 
fashionable form of American liberalism and the messianic Wilsonian fantasy of a war “to 
end all wars.” American liberalism generates a self-righteous brand of pseudo-
humanitarianism blind to the terrible dangers of state violence waged under the banner 
of a (fictional) singular humanity. Waged in the name of humanity, ‘liberal wars, far from 
fulfilling the liberal hopes [to end war], even brought about the very evils which they were 
supposed to destroy. Far from being the “last wars,” they were only the forerunners and 
pioneers of wars more destructive and extensive” than pre-liberal ones.’23 Those who 
oppose the American-dominated liberal international system constitute pariahs and 
criminals deserving of harsh punishment.24 Blurring any meaningful distinction between 
legality and morality, those who dare to oppose the American-dominated vision of an 
international legal community are demonized and accordingly subjected to terrible 
brutalities. Warfare reverts to the horrors of the pre-Westphalian era, when foreign foes 
were more than mere dueling partners: they were deemed morally inferior and 
potentially subhuman in character. Even worse: modern technology heightens the 
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destructive capacity of modern warfare and makes unprecedented acts of violence 
relatively commonplace. The apex of liberal self-righteousness is the view that liberal 
wars no longer even deserve to be described as “wars.” Although their technological 
prowess permits liberal states to kill innocent civilians in any corner of the globe, they 
purportedly undertake “police action” (or, in more recent parlance, humanitarian 
intervention) for the sake of enforcing international law, whereas only outcast (non-
liberal) states who dare to challenge liberal hegemony continue to engage in the 
barbarism of war. The exclusionary character of liberal universalism is thereby taken to 
its logical conclusion: liberal international law requires what Schmitt describes as a 
discriminatory concept of war.25 In stark contrast to the Hobbesian traits of the early 
Westphalian system, sovereign states no longer possess equal or “neutral” rights to 
wage war. As Morgenthau observes, liberals criticize autocratic and totalitarian wars, yet 
‘on the other hand, [when] the use of arms is intended to bring the blessings of liberalism 
to peoples not yet enjoying them or to protect them against despotic aggression, the just 
end may justify means otherwise condemned.’26
This vision of liberal international law rests on a false universalism because self-
interested liberal great powers (e.g., the United States and Great Britain) skillfully exploit 
it in order to pursue their specific power interests. Liberal international law is not, in fact, 
representative of a mythical “world public opinion”: it reflects specifically Anglo-American 
political and economic ideals. Following Schmitt, Morgenthau believes that one can still 
detect an instinctual sense for “the political” (or, in Morgenthau’s terminology, sound 
pursuit of “power politics” and the “national interest”) behind the moralistic and legalistic 
rhetoric of American foreign policy.27 American global influence rests, Schmitt similarly 
argues, on an uncritical acceptance by the world community of a set of inherently 
imperialistic liberal categories that dutifully reflect U.S. (and sometimes Anglo-American) 
political and economic interests.28
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To be sure, Morgenthau modifies core elements of this story. Most significantly, 
his writings offer a vastly more subtle appreciation of the political culture and intellectual 
traditions of his adopted country: like so many of the German-Jewish refugee 
intellectuals who made their homes in the United States, Morgenthau soon came to 
embrace, though by no means uncritically, many features of the U.S. political tradition.29 
In this spirit, he struggled to identify indigenous voices who might be interpreted as 
having anticipated some of his own theoretical and political proclivities: Morgenthau 
delighted in holding up the examples of Alexander Hamilton and Abraham Lincoln as 
exemplars of authentically political thinkers. Yet Morgenthau’s harsh assessment of 
contemporary American foreign policy means that he typically is forced to locate these 
more attractive elements of the American political tradition in the distant past. He 
complements his Schmitt-inspired nostalgia for the early modern European system with 
a nostalgic portrayal of the early years of the American republic and yet another 
Verfallsgeschichte.30 In the Defense of the National Interest argues that the earliest 
years of U.S. foreign policy alone endorsed the verities of realist doctrine, whereas 
decadent “ideological” and “utopian” modes of foreign policy superceded this brief 
foundational shining moment of realist intellectual hegemony.31  
Morgenthau’s critical account of the Schmittian bugbear of liberal universalism is 
also more plausible than the original version. Rejecting Schmitt’s open-ended 
broadsides against universalism (or, in Schmitt’s own polemical terminology, 
‘normativism’), Morgenthau offers a more convincing analysis of how modern political 
ideologies absorbed the universalistic pretensions of the European past while 
simultaneously disfiguring their worthwhile elements. Noble moral and cultural ideals 
claming universal validity are replaced by disturbingly parochial political visions (for 
example, an American version of liberalism derived from special conditions of 
nineteenth-century U.S. political development) that inherit the claim to universal validity 
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found in traditional moral ideals and aspirations. The immediate result is secularized 
‘political religions’ claiming universal validity but insensitive to their own time and place-
based limitations. The rise of political religions not only contributes to the destruction of 
the shared moral and cultural consensus of European society, but it also proves 
inconsistent with the complicated operations of elite-dominated diplomacy and balance 
of power politics. Reminiscent of Schmitt, Morgenthau envisions the post-1945 era as a 
“global civil war” pitting two political religions claiming universal validity (American 
liberalism and Soviet communism) in a life-or death struggle. Given the rigid dynamics of 
a bipolar world, the most attractive features of the traditional state system undergo 
dramatic decay: the ‘two superpowers and their allies and satellites face each other like 
two fighters in a short and narrow lane.’32 Here as well, Morgenthau shares Schmitt’s 
anxieties about the decline of European civilization, while simultaneously amending 
them: whereas Schmitt clearly sees American and Soviet domination of Europe as an 
unmitigated disaster, Morgenthau tends to emphasize the cultural and political 
commonalities of European and American civilization. In this manner, the United States 
is reinterpreted, pace Schmitt, as a defender of an embattled European civilization.33  
For both authors, the history of American foreign policy rests on a reckless 
dialectic of “interventionism and isolationism;” both argue that these seemingly disparate 
features of American foreign policy really represent two sides of the same coin.34 They 
also offer a number of shared observations about the specific operations of American 
power. For example, Schmitt considers the non-intervention treaty to be one of the most 
creative U.S. innovations in modern international law. The nonintervention treaties 
pursued by the United States in Latin and South America are in fact intervention treaties 
since the United States maintains the right to intervene if certain vaguely defined 
conditions  --“public order,” “the protection of life, liberty, and property,” etc.—are not 
violated.  
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 In the case of all of these nonintervention agreements it is important to note 
that due to the indeterminacy of their concepts the hegemonic power decides 
at its discretion and thereby places the political existence of the controlled 
state in its own hands.35  
The de facto military and political prowess of the United States means that in most cases 
it unilaterally determines the meaning of the vague legal clauses at hand. Morgenthau 
not only refers expressly to Schmitt’s analysis of the nonintervention treaty,36 but he 
similarly underscores its significance as an instrument of U.S. power. Not the main body 
of the general norms of the nonintervention treaty, but rather its declaration of a series of 
exceptions to the rules of nonintervention allows us best to understand the real state of 
affairs between the great powers and lesser states. Like Schmitt, Morgenthau asserts 
the ‘impossibility of developing a coherent [legal] doctrine of nonintervention.’37 Power 
politics, not the legal niceties of treaty makers, ultimately determines the dynamics of 
intervention and nonintervention. Great powers in pursuit of their national interests will 
also be forced to undermine the express spirit of nonintervention treaties. 
 
 
1.b. Back to the Monroe Doctrine? 
 
Despite his nostalgia for the Westphalian state system, Schmitt early on grasped 
that its days were numbered. Anticipating contemporary debates about globalization, 
Schmitt quickly reached the conclusion that the nation-state was no longer sufficiently 
attuned to the regulatory and military challenges of contemporary political life.38 But if 
ambitious liberal models of international law were unacceptable, what alternative political 
forms presented themselves as plausible alternatives? Schmitt’s answer to this question, 
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which he formulated between the 1930s and ‘50s, was clear enough: regionalization. 
Regionally based political and economic blocs, dominated by a single hegemonic power 
(in Schmitt’s terminology from the Nazi period, a Reich), was both the best way to avoid 
the pathologies of universalistic liberal international law and ensure effective state 
action. During the Nazi period, Schmitt’s preference for regional political and economic 
blocs meshed neatly with Nazi imperialism: Schmitt enthusiastically sketched out the 
conceptual foundations for a Nazi-dominated European ‘greater region’ [Grossraum] as 
an alternative to the twin universalistic sisters of Anglo-American liberalism and Soviet 
communism.  
The most provocative facet of this argument is Schmitt’s attempt to employ a 
selective reading of U.S. political experience as a justification for a German-dominated 
European ‘greater region’. According to Schmitt, it was the Americans who in fact 
uncovered the organizational and normative virtues of regionalization; Wilsoniam 
liberalism, it turns out, represents an abandonment of earlier more sound U.S. ideas 
about international politics. Even Schmitt’s early Weimar-era writings exhibit a 
fascination with the manner in which the Monroe Doctrine functioned as an instrument of 
U.S. domination in Latin and South America. During the nineteenth century, Schmitt 
argues, the Monroe Doctrine possessed an authentically “political” character, based on 
its acknowledgement of the life-or-death existential threat posed to the fledgling 
American Republic by European monarchies. In stark contrast to the League of Nations 
and other ambitious liberal visions of supranational legal order, the Monroe Doctrine 
helped assure a necessary dose of homogeneity within the Americas: it allowed the 
United States to intervene in order to guarantee that a particular (liberal democratic) 
vision of political and social order would be established by all American states.39 In a 
revealing 1932 essay, Schmitt can barely restrain his enthusiasm for the ‘astonishing 
political achievement’ of the Monroe Doctrine: the Monroe Doctrine is of ‘world-historical 
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significance’, a true manifestation of a ‘real and great imperialism.’40 The Americans 
have taught the rest of the world that the essence of effective power is the manipulation 
of elastic legal clauses (e.g., the exception clauses of nonintervention treaties) for the 
sake of swallowing up small and medium-sized states whose sovereignty is unlikely to 
survive the rapid economic, technological, and military transformations of the present 
era. In conjunction with its manipulation of the legal instruments of the nonintervention 
treaty, the Americans have brilliantly employed the Monroe Doctrine to unveil the future 
face of international relations: the globe is destined to be carved up into a small group of 
‘huge complexes’, encompassing entire continents or more, in which a single political 
entity exercises de facto sovereignty over its neighbors.41 The United States’ de facto 
domination of the Americas represents the future of international relations everywhere. 
Schmitt enviously observes in 1932 that ‘as a German’ examining the U.S. usage of the 
Monroe Doctrine ‘I can only have the feeling of being a beggar in rags talking about the 
riches and valuables of strangers.’42
In 1939, Schmitt directly appealed to the Monroe Doctrine in order to suggest 
how Germany might successfully join the ranks of the world’s great powers. Schmitt 
argued that the Nazis would have to develop their own version of the Monroe Doctrine in 
order to establish a European ‘huge complex’ destined to swallow up small and medium-
size European states by subjecting them to de facto Nazi control. In a clever polemical 
move, Schmitt claimed that Nazi Germany could learn from the foreign policy of the 
United States in order to offer a viable alternative to Wilsonian liberalism: American 
liberalism could be fought with its own impressive arsenal of weapons. Of course, the 
Nazis would have to discard the “decadent” liberal democratic ideals with which the 
Americans had always packaged the Monroe Doctrine. According to Schmitt, not until 
the conclusion of the nineteenth century did the Americans recklessly subordinate the 
sensible core ideas of the Monroe Doctrine to the dangerous missionary impulses of 
 15
universalistic liberalism. An identifiably Nazi “greater region” would do well to embrace 
the Monroe Doctrine’s original geopolitical ideas, which presciently anticipated the 
twentieth-century trends towards regionalization by insisting that “alien” powers had no 
legitimate political role in the Americas. Just as the U.S. in the nineteenth century had 
monopolized the task of warding off “alien” (e.g., European powers), so too did it now fall 
to Nazi Germany to “protect” Europe from “alien” (American liberalism and Soviet 
communism) political threats.43     
For self-evident reasons, Morgenthau was always hesitant to acknowledge his 
dependence on Schmitt’s interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. Of course, he never 
endorsed Schmitt’s cynical appeal to the Monroe Doctrine as a justification for Nazi 
imperialism, and when he expressly refers to Nazi ideas of a “greater region,” he does 
so with obvious disdain.44 Nonetheless, Morgenthau’s discussion of the Monroe Doctrine 
bears Schmitt’s mark. Notwithstanding his nostalgia for the Westphalian system, 
Morgenthau, like Schmitt, Morgenthau early on presciently acknowledged the 
“obsolescence of the nation-state” while also rejecting ambitious liberal models of 
international law.45 For him as well, the Monroe Doctrine suggested the possibility of a 
possible alternative.  
In his 1929 dissertation, Morgenthau offers a detailed discussion of the Monroe 
Doctrine in which he acknowleges Schmitt’s view of its centrality to U.S. foreign policy, 
but similarly underscores its authentically “political” traits. As Schmitt had similarly 
argued, the Monroe Doctrine is a ‘political act’ in the truest sense of the term and thus an 
expression of its fundamental ‘life interests.’46 This argument reappears in many of 
Morgenthau’s subsequent writings on U.S. foreign policy, which repeatedly present the 
Monroe Doctrine as a paradigmatic exemplar of genuine power politics. Morgenthau 
seems no less preoccupied with the significance of the Monroe Doctrine than Schmitt. 
For both authors, the genuinely political character of the Monroe Doctrine makes it one 
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of the rare highpoints in the otherwise unfortunate history of American foreign policy, 
which too often has succumbed to naïve and ultimately irresponsible legalistic and 
moralistic impulses. In this spirit, In Defense of the National Interest begins with what 
amounts to a eulogy for the Monroe Doctrine: Morgenthau commences his depressing 
Verfallsgeschichte by praising the farsightedness of early U.S. political leaders, and the 
Monroe Doctrine serves him as a symbol of what once was right about American foreign 
policy: ‘[t]he Monroe Doctrine and the policies implementing it express that permanent 
national interest of the United States in the Western Hemisphere.’47 Echoing Schmitt, 
Morgenthau occasionally suggests that attempts at the end of the nineteenth century to 
extend the scope of the Monroe Doctrine beyond the Americas represented an 
abandonment of its original function as a sound instrument of hemispheric power 
politics; since McKinley, attempts to apply it have been polluted by inappropriately 
ambitious universalistic models of political organization.48 Finally, Morgenthau draws the 
same tight link between the U.S. employment of nonintervention treaties and the Monroe 
Doctrine, essentially accepting Schmitt’s view that they represent two sides of the same 
coin of U.S. regional domination in the Americas.49  
Even more striking is the manner in which Morgenthau again reproduces the 
blind spots of Schmitt’s arguments. Neither author seems particularly concerned with the 
high price paid by Latin and South American peoples for U.S. regional hegemony; on the 
contrary, both consider the Monroe Doctrine a fundamentally positive political 
achievement. Schmitt’s celebration of what both authors describe as ‘imperialism’ is 
hardly surprising given his basic normative commitments. However, Morgenthau’s 
avowed commitment to basic liberal democratic political ideals meshes less well with his 
embrace of U.S. hegemony in the Americas.50 In addition, the argument suffers from a 
number of historical oversights. The dominant power in South America until the end of 
the nineteenth century was probably Great Britain, not the United States. In contrast to 
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the Schmitt-Morgenthau interpretation, American foreign policy in the nineteenth century 
hardly resisted all European intervention, and the United States was not always the 
dominant power in some sort of American ‘greater region’. The scope of the Monroe 
Doctrine was indeed extended beyond its original geopolitical boundaries at the end of 
the nineteenth century, but the driving forces in that expansion was very different from 
those described by Schmitt and Morgenthau. As reinterpreted by Theodore Roosevelt 
and defenders of U.S. expansionism in the Far East, the Monroe Doctrine was given a 
Social Darwinian and racist gloss, as captured concisely by Senator Albert J. Beveridge, 
who piously declared in 1900 that ‘God has made us adepts in government that we may 
administer government among savage and senile peoples.’51 The move to transform the 
Monroe Doctrine into an instrument of global domination in fact rested on missionary 
impulses in U.S. political consciousness, but pace Schmitt and Morgenthau as well, it is 
misleading to attribute those impulses to moralistic liberalism or liberal legal 
‘normativism’. 
A decisive difference separates Morgenthau’s discussion of the Monroe Doctrine 
from Schmitt’s, however. Whereas Schmitt argues that the Monroe Doctrine offers a 
constructive game plan for establishing new modes of regionally based imperialism, 
Morgenthau is openly skeptical of proposals for revitalizing the Monroe Doctrine as the 
core of U.S. foreign policy. According to Morgenthau’s postwar writings, this is precisely 
what isolationists and neo-isolationists want: they naively believe that the United States 
can remove itself from non-American affairs while comfortably maintaining its hegemony 
in Latin and South America. For Morgenthau, such proposals fail to tackle the novel 
political challenges of the mid-twentieth century. They ignore the profound threats posed 
to the United States by extra-American powers, and naively continue to consider the 
hemispheric isolation of the United States a source of security. They also ignore the fact 
that the Monroe Doctrine always required a rough balance of power in Europe which 
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preventing any single European power from gaining too much power and thereby 
potentially threatening U.S. hegemony in the Americas. If such a balance of power were 
to be preserved after 1945, he repeatedly argues, the United States would have to be 
actively involved on the European theater of the cold war –in order to prevent Soviet 
domination of Europe and ultimately a Soviet threat to U.S. domination of the 
Americas.52   
As Morgenthau quickly recognized after 1945, the advent of high-speed air 
warfare53 and atomic weapons rendered any easy return to the Monroe Doctrine as the 
key feature of U.S. foreign policy anachronistic. The Monroe Doctrine remained a model 
of sound realist foreign policy thinking, but no object of blind veneration. 
 
 
2. Schmitt and Morgenthau vs.the World State  
 
Morgenthau’s postwar writings pursue the dual goal of reshaping the study of 
international relations and influencing U.S. foreign policy. Unfortunately, a striking 
tension plagues his intellectual and political project. After 1945, Morgenthau emphasized 
the obsolescence of the nation-state as well as the necessity of a world state in order to 
guarantee lasting peace. As Morgenthau stated with characteristic bluntness, ‘there is no 
shirking the conclusion that international peace cannot be permanent without a world 
state.’54 Yet he stubbornly continued to underscore the utopian character of most 
attempts to create ambitious models of supranational governance: Politics Among 
Nations notes ‘that international peace through the transformation of the present society 
of sovereign nations into a world state is unattainable under the moral, social, and 
political conditions’ of our times.55 Morgenthau’s most influential postwar work then 
proceeds to pillory both the League of Nations and United Nations. Ours is, indeed, a 
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tragic situation: the dominant moral traditions of the West condemn the brutality of war; 
war can only be effectively avoided by a world state; aspirations for a world state remain 
unrealizable and, indeed, potentially dangerous if allowed to join ideological forces with 
moralistic and legalistic liberalism.  
By the late 1950s, Morgenthau presciently grasped that the real possibility of 
thermonuclear destruction implied a qualitative and not simply quantitative shift in the 
character of modern warfare. The risky quest for power among nation-states might now 
rapidly culminate in a war that would decimate the human species. The means of 
warfare might easily undermine the ends (the “national interest”) since atomic warfare 
would not only destroy the modern state system but humankind itself. ‘Because they 
render meaningful military victory impossible, nuclear weapons fundamentally alter the 
traditional relationship between force and foreign policy.’56 If atomic weapons were left 
under the control of individual nation-states, ‘their increase and improvement increase 
the danger. Thus, it becomes the task of all governments to make themselves 
superfluous as the guardians of their respective territorial frontiers by transferring their 
nuclear weapons to an agency whose powers are commensurate with the worldwide 
destructive potentialities of these weapons.’57 The only solution, Morgenthau posited, 
was ultimately the establishment of a fundamentally novel global order in which control 
over weapons of mass destruction would be taken out of the hands of individual nation-
states.  
As Campbell Craig has observed, Morgenthau was able ‘to glimpse –not to 
design, to glimpse—a new, that is, unforeseen political process whereby a condition of 
anarchy evolves in a new Leviathan; a world state that comes into being merely because 
of the prospect of a nuclear war of all against all.’58 Morgenthau only glimpsed the 
necessity of a novel global order, however, because it went against the grain of so many 
of the basic tenets of his thinking. Most important, it clashed fundamentally with the 
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Realist assumption of the fundamentally ‘anarchic character of the international 
environment.’59 Nonetheless, a striking shift characterizes his writings in the 1960s and 
early 1970s. Although remaining steadfast in his view that the establishment of a world 
government remained remote, he now often emphasized the moral imperative of its 
establishment at least as much as the pathologies of the dominant attempts to move in 
this direction (e.g. the United Nations). In Craig’s view, Morgenthau reluctantly began to 
concede that ‘the prospect of thermonuclear war had caused the utopian and realistic 
approaches’ in international relations to merge.60  
Unfortunately, Morgenthau never succeeded in undertaking the necessary 
theoretical synthesis. In his late writings, aphoristic existential anxieties about the fate of 
humankind exist uneasily alongside his familiar battery of criticisms of universalism and 
liberal international law.61 His policy advice to U.S. foreign policy makers oscillates 
uneasily between nostalgic appeals to salvage old-fashioned elite-dominated diplomacy 
and increasingly ambitious proposals for supranational governance. Morgenthau’s debts 
to Schmitt play a significant role in his unsuccessful attempt to overcome the basic 
tensions of his thinking. It would be mistaken to attribute Morgenthau’s embrace of the 
necessity of the world state and simultaneous emphasis on its impracticality exclusively 
to his ‘tragic vision of politics’.62 Morgenthau was never able to think creatively enough 
about the possibility of a novel global order because he carried too much Schmittian 
intellectual baggage.    
To be sure, Morgenthau himself was partly aware of the underlying tensions in 
his theory. He consequently struggles to describe paths by which we might move closer 
to a world state and avoid the horrors of contemporary warfare, while also resisting the 
false temptations of Wilsonian liberalism. In this vein, he repeatedly underscores the 
virtues of traditional diplomacy: ‘If the world state is unattainable in our world, yet 
indispensable for the survival of that world, it is necessary to create the conditions under 
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which it will not be impossible…This method of establishing the preconditions for 
permanent peace we call peace through accommodation. Its instrument is diplomacy.’63
Morgenthau then offers his famous ‘plea for the restoration of diplomacy to the 
eminence of its high days in old Europe, when its coolness of head and its clarity of sight 
prevailed over a public opinion not yet made unruly by mass ideologies…’.64 
Revealingly, this nostalgic vision of diplomacy builds directly on his Schmitt-inspired 
account of the “golden age” of the early modern European-dominated international 
system. What the contemporary world urgently needs, Morgenthau asserts, is a revival 
of elite-dominated diplomacy and, to the extent still possible, traditional balance of power 
thinking. These constitutive features of the Westphalian system, it seems, provide the 
best immediate protection against the specter of nuclear war.  
As many commentators have noted, however, Morgenthau’s recourse to 
traditional diplomacy seems at best naïve and at worst misguided. Having established 
the far-reaching structural roots of its decline, Morgenthau is able to offer little more than 
a desperate plea for its reestablishment without really explaining how traditional 
diplomacy might thrive in a political environment fundamentally hostile to its operations. 
Characteristically, Morgenthau also downplays the least appealing implications of his 
nostalgia. As James Speer has pointedly observed, a return to traditional diplomacy 
would necessitate ‘the repeal of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which have 
witnessed the rise of popular sovereignty and ideology.’65 In fact, when describing the 
pathologies of contemporary foreign policy making, Morgenthau underscores the 
eminently democratic “vices” of publicity and majority decision making.66 He also worries 
about excessive legislative controls on U.S. foreign policy making in the United States –
a surprising concern given the awesome expansion of executive prerogative during the 
twentieth century.67 Despite his best efforts, Morgenthau never really succeeds in 
explaining how a revival of traditional diplomacy might be synthesized with modern 
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democracy. In Schmitt’s nostalgic account of the Westphalian system, its anti-
democratic elements generate no theoretical tension since Schmitt is hostile to modern 
notions of popular sovereignty anyhow. For Morgenthau, however, dependence on this 
nostalgia produces profound theoretical difficulties since he rejects Schmitt’s 
authoritarian political preferences. One immediate result of this tension are the 
increasingly shrill criticisms Morgenthau levels at individual U.S. policy makers: at times 
he seems to believe that it is simply the (democratically based) intellectual and 
professional mediocrity of American leaders that constitutes a central source of the 
pathologies of U.S. foreign policy. No wonder that Morgenthau repeatedly cites 
Tocqueville’s conservative arguments about the tensions between modern democracy 
and foreign policy making.68 If only the United States could recapture the farsighted 
wisdom of the pre-democratic statesmen of early modern Europe!  
A second argumentative strategy points to Morgenthau’s Weimar background as 
well. Although he rejects potentially reckless attempts, including Schmitt’s, to rely on the 
Monroe Doctrine as an immediate guide for reconstructing the international system, 
Morgenthau similarly exhibits some sympathy for political and economic regionalization, 
under the auspices of a regional great power and resting on some form of homogeneity. 
In Schmittian terms: supranational organization can only work when 1) it rests on a far-
reaching set of shared values and commitments and 2) acknowledges the dominant 
position of one state or group of states. In Defense of the National Interest thus argues 
that Americans should drop their hostility to the traditional notion of a ‘sphere of 
influence’: ‘it is indeed obvious…from the political history of the human race that the 
balance of power and concomitant spheres of influence are of the very essence of 
international politics.’69 A division of the globe by means of a ‘negotiated settlement’ into 
distinct spheres of influence, each dominated by one of the superpowers, offers the best 
possibility for peace and stability between the ‘free world’ and its Russian rival.70 Even 
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Morgenthau’s most creative proposals for reordering the global system are haunted by 
the ghosts of Weimar. The ambitious Purpose of American Politics – where Morgenthau 
hints clearly at the possibility of merging Realist and “utopian” views of international 
relations-- advocates a supranational ‘free-world association’, under U.S. leadership, 
whose main achievement would be to take the first step towards breaking the 
increasingly explosive chain between statehood and the monopoly on violence by 
placing the control of nuclear weapons under supranational control. Only by such a ‘free 
association of [liberal democratic] states’ would America ‘share its purpose with its 
associates.’71 Significantly, this free-world association would be ‘more intimate’ than 
traditional alliances or ad hoc alignments, and it would rest on a modicum of ideological 
homogeneity since it would consist of like-minded states sharing the American 
commitment to ‘equality in freedom.’72 Only then might the United States successfully 
‘use its predominant power on behalf of a purpose that would be not only its own but 
also one in which the non-Communist world could recognize its distinct character and in 
whose achievement it could experience a common destiny.’73 In contradistinction to 
doomed universalistic models of supranational organization, this prospect is more than a 
vague dream because ‘the interests that tie the United States to its European allies are 
more profound, more comprehensive, and more stable than the interests upon which 
alliances have traditionally been based…[T]hese interests enclose the national identities 
of all its members within a common civilization threatened by an alien and oppressive 
social system.’74
Morgenthau always conceded that even the most ambitious regionalist models of 
supranational organization were at best steppingstones to a world state that alone could 
ensure lasting peace. Thus, his regionalist theoretical tendencies ultimately leave the 
riddle of his postwar theory unsolved: in the face of nuclear extinction, we desperately 
require a world state, yet such a state remains at best a distant possibility.  
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Unfortunately, Morgenthau builds on another facet of Schmitt’s thinking that 
ultimately prevents him from moving beyond this dead end. Morgenthau does not simply 
consider a world-state unrealistic given present conditions. Like Schmitt, he also tends to 
consider it unattractive to the extent that it would unduly violate the “autonomy of the 
political.” Morgenthau is generally less blunt than Schmitt in advancing this second 
fundamentally normative argument against ambitious modes of supranational 
organization. Nonetheless, it remains a crucial source of the underlying tensions of his 
brand of Realism, as well as a central reason why he seems so hesitant to reconsider its 
core tenets despite his acknowledgement of the fundamental novelty of the nuclear era. 
In the 1932 version of The Concept of the Political, rewritten with Morgenthau’s 
conceptual innovations in mind, Schmitt writes: 
 
A world in which the possibility of war is utterly eliminated, a completely 
pacified globe, would be a world without the distinction of friend and enemy 
and hence a world without politics. It is conceivable that such a world might 
contain many interesting antitheses and contrasts, competitions and 
intrigues of every kind, but there would not be a meaningful antithesis 
whereby men could be required to sacrifice life, authorized to shed blood, 
and kill other human beings…The phenomenon of the political can be 
understood only in the context of the ever present possibility of the friend-
and-enemy grouping….75
 
‘[R]ejecting the illusory security of a status quo of comfort and ease’, while ‘holding in 
low esteem a world of mere entertainment and the mere capacity to be interesting’, 
Schmitt attacks ambitious liberal democratic proposals for supranational rule76 A world 
without “intense” conflicts, characterized by the possibility of killing the ‘enemy’, would 
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devalue and potentially trivialize human existence. It also rebels against human nature: 
Schmitt directly links his ‘concept of political’ to a pessimistic version of philosophical 
anthropology. 
Morgenthau shares Schmitt’s concern with defending the ‘autonomy of the 
political’, and similarly delights in attacking liberalism for ‘depreciating’ the centrality of 
the struggle for power to human existence. To the extent that he also links his 
interpretation of the concept of the political to the fundaments of human nature, any 
attempt to rid the universe of “the political” similarly must seem not only unrealistic but 
also undesirable.77 By necessity, ambitious models of transnational government 
potentially represent an assault on human nature because they would rid human 
experience of those conflicts that are most intense and thus authentically political in 
nature. To be sure, Morgenthau stresses that the struggle for power can manifest itself 
in many arenas of human activity. Presumably, even a world state would provide 
opportunities for such struggles. Yet he also suggests that interstate conflicts –
characterized by what Schmitt dubbed the ‘real possibility of killing’ the enemy—
represent the most authentic expression of “the political.” Within the terms of 
Morgenthau’s own ‘model of intensity’, the attempt to eliminate interstate violence by 
means of ambitious transnational governance necessarily undermines the rightful place 
in human existence of political conflict. Not surprisingly, Morgenthau, like Schmitt, 
repeatedly criticizes novel experiments with global political decision making –most 
important: the League of Nations and United Nations—as misguided and 
characteristically liberal attempts to supplant “the political” with inappropriate forms of 
legalism and moralism. Such experiments constitute a denial of the pluralistic character 
of human experience since they subject a legitimate and necessary form of human 
action to the laws of competing modes of action.  
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Unfortunately, the resulting theoretical paradox for Morgenthau is obvious 
enough: the world state is an existential necessity, but the last century’s most impressive 
quests to achieve a new transnational order are ultimately anti-political and thus 
intrinsically flawed.  No wonder Morgenthau struggles unsuccessfully to show how we 
might move from interstate anarchy to the world state we purportedly need so 
desperately. 
Interestingly, Morgenthau is dismissive of proposals for pacific federations or 
confederations of states. This is, of course, crucial because many if not most modern 
cosmopolitan theorists –including Immanuel Kant –have advocated something alone 
these lines rather than a centralized world state.78 This hostility is motored by the 
assumption --probably borrowed from Schmitt—that international law typically proves at 
best of limited value and more often counterproductive when resting on heterogeneous 
political, cultural, and ideological elements.79 Morgenthau never really takes such 
proposals seriously for a second reason as well: they conflict with his ideas about 
sovereignty. At times clearly echoing Schmitt’s interpretation of sovereignty as the 
capacity to act effectively during a crisis or emergency,80 Morgenthau writes that in a 
democracy, the exercise of sovereignty ‘lies dormant in normal times, barely visible 
through the network of constitutional arrangements and legal rules.’ Democratic systems 
‘purposefully obscured the problem of sovereignty and glossed over the need for a 
definition location of the sovereign power’ with legalistic and constitutional niceties 
masking the real nature of power.81 ‘Yet in times of crisis and war that ultimately 
responsibility asserts itself’, when ‘a man or a group of men’ – Morgenthau’s examples 
for his primarily American audience are Lincoln, Wilson, and the two Roosevelts -  
exercise supreme and fundamentally undivided power. Sovereignty cannot, in fact, ‘be 
vested in the people as a whole, who, of course, as such cannot act.’82 If states are to 
act ‘in times of crisis’, undivided and supreme sovereignty must be placed in the hands 
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of some individual or group of individuals. Because indivisibility and supremacy are 
constitutive features of sovereignty, and every effective state requires sovereignty, 
proposals for supranational government that fall short of a centralized world-state are 
intrinsically incoherent: 
 We have heard it said time and again that we must “surrender 
 part of our sovereignty” to an international organization for the  
 sake of world peace, that we must “share” our sovereignty with 
 such an organization, that the latter would have a certain “limited 
sovereignty” while we would keep the substance of it…We shall endeavor to 
show that the conception of a divisible sovereignty is  contrary to logic and 
politically unfeasible…83
Not only is divisible – or in present-day parlance, ‘differentiated - sovereignty 
inconsistent with the very nature of the state, but any supranational political and legal 
institutions committed to realizing confused ideas about sovereignty are destined to 
founder in the face of war or dire crisis. For Morgenthau, the League of Nations’ failure 
to act in the face of Japanese and German aggression always represented paradigmatic 
examples of such failures.84
Morgenthau’s definition of sovereignty, like its Schmittian inspiration, suffers from 
a misleadingly one-sided focus on the emergency or crisis; its personalistic emphasis on 
the necessity of decision making by ‘one man or group of men’, along with its dismissal 
of the notion of popular sovereignty, inadvertently reproduces Schmitt’s anti-democratic 
views. Here as well, we encounter Morgenthau’s deeply rooted nostalgia for early 
modern Europe: his conception of sovereignty builds upon ideas about state sovereignty 
that emerged in European Absolutism. Morgenthau probably fails to appreciate how 
ideas of popular sovereignty break with such traditional notions of state sovereignty.85 
Not surprisingly, he misses how the American Republic reshaped traditional ideas of 
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sovereignty, interpreting the U.S. founding in overly traditional terms and misleadingly 
suggesting that all the Philadelphia Convention ‘did was to replace one constitution, one 
sovereignty, one state with another one, best resting upon the same pre-existing 
community.’86 In this interpretation, the United States takes the form of a fundamentally 
conventional (European-style) nation-state resting on a far-reaching set of shared values 
and cultural commitments.87  
Speer has countered Morgenthau’s definition of sovereignty by responding that: 
  [i]f sovereignty means supremacy, supremacy as to what? 
  If it means supremacy as to all things, then sovereignty  
  logically is present only in the totalitarian state. If it means less 
  than all things, then sovereignty logically is present where 
  there is supremacy as to only some things. And if this is true, then  
  one government can be supreme as to some things while another  
  government is supreme as to some other things.88
 
For this reason, Morgenthau’s hostility to alternative forms of relatively decentralized 
supranational organization rests on sand: ‘It is the essence of the federal principle that 
different things are done by different governments…each government acting within its 
own sphere of authority upon the same individual human beings.’89 Thus, effective state 
action is by no means inconsistent with any of a host of complex forms of complex or 
differentiated sovereignty potentially realizable at the transnational level. Pace 
Morgenthau (and Schmitt), various proposals for federal or co-federal supranational 
government might very well prove consistent with sovereignty. 
If the only conceivable form of transnational rule, in the final instance, is a 
centralized world state outfitted with indivisible and supreme sovereign power, no 
wonder that Morgenthau ultimately remained so worried about its potential dangers. 
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Most cosmopolitan theorists might easily endorse his concern that a world state can only 
be achieved by illegitimate force and consequently might entail nothing more than ‘a 
totalitarian monster resting on feet of clay’ forced to ‘maintain complete discipline and 
loyalty.’90  
To Morgenthau’s enormous credit, his refreshing awareness of the illusions of 
great power political pretences often made him suitably critical of the pathologies of 
American foreign policy.91 He also came to see that human wellbeing in the nuclear era 
required a fundamental break with traditional forms of international organization. 
Unfortunately, deeply rooted intellectual proclivities –many of which emerged in his 
complex “hidden dialogue” with Carl Schmitt—prevented Morgenthau from seriously 
considering possible alternatives to a centralized world state.  
 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
 A number of Morgenthau’s most influential ideas about U.S. foreign policy 
emerged in the context of a “hidden dialogue” with Carl Schmitt. Those ideas played a 
crucial role in Morgenthau’s ultimately unsuccessful attempt to synthesize Realism with 
what he typically dismissed as “utopianism” in international relations. But are there any 
contemporary lessons we might draw from this story?  
Once again, we are witnessing a revival of ambitious and arguably utopian 
models of transnational political and legal order.92 And once again, we also see a 
resurgence of Realist theory that delights in poking holes in the ideas of “legalistic” 
cosmopolitanism.93 To Morgenthau’s credit, he understood that we would need to move 
beyond this theoretical divide and consider the possibility of fruitfully merging 
cosmopolitan and Realist ideas about international relations. His own failure to do so 
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also underscores the profound difficulties inherent in the attempt to do so. In particular, it 
is unlikely that any normatively desirable cosmopolitan vision will be able to borrow 
much if anything from the political thought of Carl Schmitt; Morgenthau’s own failures 
stem at least in part from his unwieldy Schmittian intellectual baggage. Nonetheless, 
Morgenthau’s intellectual challenge needs to be taken seriously. For those of us, like 
Morgenthau, willing to acknowledge the potential misuse of universalistic political 
rhetoric as a fig leaf for great power imperialism, while also recognizing the necessity of 
fundamentally reordering the international system in order to guarantee human survival, 
a cosmopolitanism able to integrate the best insights of Realism remains a desirable 
intellectual aspiration. 
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